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ENDOGENOUS CARTEL FORMATION 




Real-world collusive agreements do not necessarily include all firms that are active in the cartelized industry. 
Often, cartels are formed by asymmetric firms offering products that are not completely homogenous. This 
article endogenizes the process of cartel formation in a simulation model where firms are asymmetric in 
marginal costs and offer differentiated products. After a cartel is formed, it may be destabilized if the evolution 
of costs produces a sufficiently asymmetric cost-structure. In this case, the cartelists use price wars to stabilize 
the collusive agreement. Cartels arise as the outcome of a dynamic formation game in mixed strategies. This 
game is complex because of firms' asymmetry and the multitude of possible cartel-compositions. I show that the 
Nash-equilibrium of this game can be obtained efficiently by a Differential Evolution stochastic optimization 
algorithm. It turns out that large firms gain more from colluding than small firms. Nevertheless, large firms 
choose a lower probability of joining the cartel.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
The Belgian beer cartel is one example of a collusive agreement in a market where asymmetric 
firms offer a differentiated product. While much literature on collusion focuses on industries with 
symmetric firms and homogeneous products, this article proposes a model of collusion in markets 
with asymmetric firms and differentiated products. An important element in this model is the 
endogenous choice of firms whether to form a cartel. I find that – in terms of profits – large firms 
gain more from colluding than small firms. Interestingly, large firms optimally choose a low 
probability of cartel-participation. The reason for this is a strategic one. By choosing a low 
participation-probability large firms reduce the chance that small firms free-ride on the cartel. 
Additionally, I find that greater product-homogeneity raises the internal stability of a cartel whose 
combined market share is small. However, homogeneity decreases cartel-stability when the 
combined market share of the cartel is high.
These results are of particular importance as they are derived from a comprehensive but 
fairly standard model. The model is comprehensive because it allows for different degrees of 
product-differentiation and cost-asymmetry as well as a wide variety in the number of firms in the 
industry. The model is standard because it relies on well-known theories regarding product 
differentiation (Shubik and Levitan 1980), cartel stability (Friedman 1971, Rotemberg and Saloner 
1986), and cartel formation (Prokop 1999).
Firms are assumed to produce differentiated goods (Shubik and Levitan 1980) at constant 
marginal costs that are firm-specific and evolve over time according to a random walk (Harrington 
2008). By using a cost function of this type, I provide a fairly general model. Thus, its results 
regarding cartel-formation and cartel-stability neither depend on assumptions about dis-economies 
of scale (see, e.g., Donsimoni 1985, Vasconcelos 2005) nor on assumptions about the production 
capacity of the firms (see, e.g., Compte et al. 2002, Bos and Harrington 2010). These parameters are 
important in previous research. Colluding firms are assumed to maximize profits jointly. Therefore, 
my model does not require an assumption on the allocation of demand among cartelists as is the 
case in the model of Bos and Harrington (2010: 97).
The focus of this paper lies on endogenous cartel formation. At an exogenously given point 
in time, each firm in an industry may endogenously decide whether it participates in a newly 
established cartel or whether it prefers to remain in the competitive fringe. This decision is a 
function of firms' expected present value of profits both when joining the cartel and when remaining 
in the competitive fringe. As such, cartel formation is a function of the (expected) stability of the 
cartel. I assume that firms play a grim trigger strategy (Friedman 1971) in order to prevent Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -3-
deviations from the cartel. Allowing marginal costs to evolve over time changes the incentive of 
firms whether to deviate from a cartel. In particular, a deviation from a previously stable cartel may 
become profitable. In this case, firms are assumed to precautionarily lower the collusive price in 
order to make the deviation unprofitable (Rotemberg and Saloner 1986). In particular, firms are 
assumed to revert to the one-shot Nash-equilibrium prices. This trigger strategy generates time 
series of firms' prices that resemble those of a Green and Porter (1984)-type strategy. In contrast to 
the literature mentioned, price changes are not triggered by demand shocks but by observable cost 
shocks.
Section 2.3 presents a model of a cartel's endogenous formation. Previous research (see, e.g., 
Selten 1973, D'Aspremont et al. 1983, Diamantoudi 2005, and Kuipers and Olaizola 2008) shows 
that it can be profitable for firms to form a cartel when either the number of firms in the industry 
and/or the number of firms in the cartel is sufficiently small. However, in industries where both the 
overall number of firms and the number of cartelists is large, it can be more profitable to be a 
competitive fringe-firm rather than being a cartelist. This is because fringe-firms can expand their 
output under the price-umbrella of the cartel, while cartelists must reduce output in order to raise 
the market price. Prokop (1999) shows that even in industries with many firms a large cartel can 
arise as a Nash-equilibrium when firms play a mixed strategy in the formation game. I use this 
equilibrium-concept for modeling cartel-formation.
The assumption of cost-asymmetry practically prevents analytic solutions of the cartel 
formation game. Therefore, I resort to a new strand in the literature and propose to solve for the 
Nash-equilibrium of this complex game by means of heuristic optimization (Beck et al. 2007, 
Contreras et al. 2004, Vorobeychik and Wellmann 2008). In particular, I contribute to this literature 
by introducing a so-called objective function whose global minimum coincides with the mixed-
strategy Nash-equilibrium of the cartel-formation game. I show that this Nash-equilibrium is 
attained fast and accurately by a Differential Evolution search heuristic (Storn and Price 1997). 
Using optimization techniques for solving the model requires its numerical parametrization.
Therefore, section 3.1 is concerned with formulating a parametric function for marginal 
costs. In particular, marginal costs are assumed to follow a random walk (Harrington 2008). This is 
especially convenient with regard to the theoretical model because firms' expectation about future 
marginal costs is their current level. This assumption keeps the structure of the model easy. I argue 
that firms take into account the stability of a cartel when deciding about their participation 
probability. A cartel is rather ineffective if cartelists frequently engage in price wars, i.e. if they 
frequently revert to the competitive equilibrium in order to prevent deviations from the cartel. 
Therefore, section 3.2 proposes a method for determining a numerical value of industries' price war Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -4-
probabilities and analyzes the determinants of cartelists' incentive to deviate from the collusive 
agreement.
To my knowledge, I am the first to analyze the effect of product differentiation on cartel 
stability in the presence of a competitive fringe. In the context of all-inclusive cartels, Ross (1992: 
4) identifies two effects. “First, the segmentation of the markets through differentiation means that 
the gains from cheating are less. [... Second], the Bertrand-Nash punishments are less severe with 
differentiation.” In a model with two firms and a quadratic utility function, he finds a u-shaped 
relation between product homogeneity and cartel-stability. When products are very differentiated 
the gains from cheating are low relative to the punishment. When products are rather homogenous 
the punishment is high relative to the gain from cheating. In both cases, deviations from the 
collusive agreement are prevented quite effectively. Only for intermediate levels of product 
differentiation the gain from deviating is high relative to the punishment. This makes deviations 
more likely. My model shows that the relative strength of these effects also depends on the size of 
the competitive fringe. A strong competitive fringe constrains the deviation profit of a cartelist the 
more strongly the less differentiated products are. In this case, greater product homogeneity makes 
deviations less likely. If the competitive fringe is small this constraining effect is small, too. In this 
case, greater product homogeneity makes deviations more likely.
In section 4.1, I present the Differential Evolution stochastic search heuristic that is used to 
determine the Nash-equilibrium of the cartel formation game.  The application of search heuristics 
for solving game theoretic problems is rather new (see, e.g., Beck et al. (2007), Contreras et al. 
(2004), and Vorobeychik and Wellmann (2008)). Methodologically, I contribute to this literature by 
introducing a distance measure for the formation-game in mixed strategies.
Section  4.2  analyzes the optimal participation decision of firms. In line with previous 
research (see, e.g., Donsimoni 1985, Bos and Harrington 2010) I find that large, cost-efficient firms 
gain more from colluding relative to remaining in the competitive fringe than small, cost-inefficient 
firms. A small firm “finds it optimal not to join the cartel [...] because the effects of its membership 
on price is trivial but, at the same time, it experiences a nontrivial reduction in its output” (Bos and 
Harrington 2010: 93). In contrast, by joining the cartel a large firm raises the level of market prices 
much even for a small relative reduction of quantity.
In addition to this research, I find that this effect makes small firms join the cartel with a 
higher probability than large firms. The reason for this is a strategic one. All firms are assumed to 
correctly anticipate (for themselves and all other firms) the effect on profits of joining the cartel or 
remaining in the fringe. If large firms joined the cartel with a high probability, small firms would 
prefer to remain in the fringe and free-ride on the cartel. This is disadvantageous for the cartel-Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -5-
firms. Therefore, large firms reduce their probability of joining the cartel. By reducing the expected 
size of the cartel, this lowers the profits of all firms both in the cartel and in the fringe. Now, being 
in the cartel becomes relatively more profitable as compared to being in the fringe even for small 
firms. Hence, they raise their participation probability. To summarize this main finding of my paper: 
By choosing low participation probabilities large firms punish and to some degree prevent free-
riding behavior of small firms.
The numerical nature of the model adds a further benefit. The model allows for generating 
data on firms' prices, output quantities, and profits. In a companion paper (Paha 2010) I show that 
such data can be used to evaluate and advance empirical methods used in the detection and 
prosecution of cartels.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section  2  presents the theoretical 
model. In particular, section 2.1 presents the basic model and its one-shot Nash equilibrium. Section
2.2 elaborates on the stability of cartels in the simulated industries. Section 2.3 describes the process 
of cartel formation. Section 3 is concerned with parameterizing the model so that it can be solved by 
a stochastic search heuristic. Section  3.1  formulates a parametric function for marginal costs. 
Section 3.2 numerically determines and analyzes cartels' likeliness of ending up in a price war. 
Section 4.1 shows how the Nash-equilibrium of the cartel-formation process can be obtained by a 
stochastic search algorithm. In section 4.2, I analyze this equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
 2 THE ECONOMIC MODEL
In this section, I present the economic theory underlying my model and its basic assumptions. The 
one-shot Nash-equilibrium is outlined in section 2.1. The demand-side of the model is based on 
Shubik and Levitan's (1980) well-known utility function for differentiated products. Firms' 
production technology is characterized by marginal costs that are constant in output and vary across 
firms and over time. In this market environment firms decide whether to maximize their profits 
independently or jointly. If they decide to form a cartel, firms prevent deviations from the collusive 
agreement by engaging in price wars on the equilibrium path as is shown in section 2.2. Section 2.3 
describes the process of cartel-formation. Based on the ideas of Prokop (1999), it is shown that a 
cartel can arise as a Nash-equilibrium outcome when firms play a mixed strategy.
 2.1 The One-Shot Nash-Equilibrium
Stigler (1964: 45) proposes that homogeneous product markets are rather the exception than the 
rule. Therefore, cartels also may take place in (mildly) differentiated products markets. One 
example for such collusive agreement is the cartel in the Belgian beer market (1993-1998), where Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -6-
one would hardly argue that beer is a homogeneous product. A second example is the recent cartel 
of bathroom equipment manufacturers. In this cartel, firms colluded in differentiated products such 
as sinks, taps and fittings.
Assumption 1: To model these industries, my simulation model is based on the 
following utility function for differentiated products of a representative agent 
(Shubik and Levitan 1980). 
Vectors and matrices are denoted in bold.
V =q0U  q =q0q'  − n
2⋅  1[ q' q

n  q'  
2]   (1)
In this function q0 is the outside option of the consumers. q is a (n´1)-vector whose elements are the 
quantities qi of n products. Each product is produced by exactly one firm. Hence, there are n firms 
in the industry. 
Assumption 2: The number of firms is assumed to be fixed. 
This may be motivated by sunk costs being sufficiently high so that there are no firms outside the 
industry for whom it would be profitable to enter. i is a (n´1)-vector where each element takes a 
value of 1. v is a positive parameter and ∈[0,∞) represents the degree of substitutability
1 of the 
n products. 
Consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraint. Taking the outside option as 
numéraire, i.e. setting p0 = 1, yields optimality condition (2).
p= dU
d q'   (2)
This gives the set of inverse demand functions whose right-hand side equals dU/dq'.
p=− 1
1 nqq'   (3)





p' ]   (4)
1 For m = ∞ goods are perfect substitutes. For m = 0 goods are independent. As this paper is interested in analyzing 
(imperfect) substitutes, m is set at values greater than 0.Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -7-
Each product is produced by a one-product firm at marginal cost ci. Firms may be asymmetric in 
their cost-structure. At the output market firms compete à la Bertrand in prices. This yields the 











Solving for the vector of competitive equilibrium-prices gives.
p=I 2n2n−−' 
−1⋅nvnn−⋅c  . (6)
Firms 1 to m (with m£n) may reduce competition by forming a cartel. If they do so, they 
maximize profits jointly (Stigler 1964: 44, 45). In this case, prices rise and equation (6) becomes 
p=[I 2n2n−−'A]
−1⋅[nvnn−− A⋅c]   (7)
where A is a (n´n)-matrix of the form shown in (8). The non-zero elements in the upper left part are 
of dimension (m´m) and stand for the effect of the joint profit maximization in the cartel. 
A=









Please note that equation (6) is a special case of equation (7) with m = 0, i.e. no collusion occurs.
Assumption 3: Marginal costs have two features. (i) They are firm-specific which 
makes firms asymmetric. (ii) Cost-shocks are assumed to occur in every period such 
that marginal costs follow a random walk (Harrington 2008: 241).
Firm-specificity allows to analyze differences in firms' probabilities of participation in a cartel. The 
occurrence of cost-shocks introduces dynamics to the simulation model. A firm-specific evolution 
of costs not only affects the productive efficiency of the firms but also their competitiveness relative 
to each other. Such dynamics may create incentives to deviate from a collusive agreement that were 
not present upon the time of its establishment. This triggers price wars in order to mitigate  the 
deviation incentive of the firms. Such price wars affect the profitability of the cartel. The exact 
parametrization of marginal costs in terms of the model's numerical nature is provided in section
3.1.Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -8-
 2.2 Cartel Stability
Prokop (1999: 248) proposes that firms play a game in two stages. “In the first stage, the firms 
simultaneously decide whether to join the cartel or remain in the competitive fringe.” In the second 
stage, firms set prices as described below. The game is solved recursively. Therefore, I start with 
defining the pricing decision of the firms and the resulting profits. I turn to the cartel formation 
game in section 2.3. 
For the moment, I assume that the firms in the industry have established some cartel. Its 
composition is irrelevant for the discussions in this section. This assumption is relaxed in section
2.3. Concerning the cartel and the information structure of the model I make the following 
assumptions.
Assumption 4: No more than one cartel exists at any time (Kuipers and Olaizola 
2008: 407). The cartel does not necessarily have to consist of all n firms in the 
industry.
Assumption 5: At the beginning of each period, firms observe their own marginal 
costs and those of their competitors.
Assumption 6: It takes some time to detect a deviation from the cartel (see, e.g., 
Rotemberg and Saloner 1986). This time defines one period.
Assumption 4 is standard in the literature. Assumption 5 ensures that firms correctly anticipate their 
current, jointly maximized profits in the cartel pjpi, their profits in competition pci, and the profits 
they make when deviating from the cartel pdi. According to Assumption 6, it takes some time for 
cartelists to establish evidence of a deviation by one of the cartel's members. During this time, 
cartel- and fringe-firms leave their prices at the collusive level (see equation (7)) while deviator i 
realizes his individual profit-maximum (pdi) at levels above his cartel-profits (pjpi). This is done by 
lowering the price of good i according to the reaction function (5) of the deviator. 
Cartels are called internally unstable (D'Aspremont et al. (1983: 21), Stigler (1964: 46)) if 
their members have an incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. If the other firms were 
able to detect the deviation upon the time of its occurrence they would lower their prices and, thus, 
might render the deviation unprofitable.  D'Aspremont et al. (1983) show that the anticipation of 
such immediate reactions may prevent firm i from deviating even in a one-shot game. Reactions of 
this type are beyond the scope of this paper.
Assumption 7: Firms only consider the deviation-profits that they can make by being 
the sole deviator.Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -9-
Theoretically, d Î [1;m] cartel-firms can jointly deviate from a cartel with m members. This 





d  new equilibria. Such joint deviations are difficult in two respects. 
(i) Allowing for joint deviations might create internally stable cartels. To see this, consider the 
extreme case where all cartelists defected from the collusive agreement by lowering prices at the 
same time. This contemporaneous deviation prevents the business steeling effect which makes 
deviations profitable. Only the price effect remains. Therefore, deviation-profits will be lower than 
collusive profits. (ii) There is no uncontested method to select one of these multiple equilibria. 
Therefore, I go with the more widespread solution (see, e.g., Bos and Harrington (2010: 106)) and 
define deviation profits according to the concept of stability rather than strong stability (Hart and 
Kurz 1983: 1048). A cartel is called stable if for any single firm there is no individual incentive to 
deviate from the cartel. In contrast, a cartel is called strongly internally stable if “for all possible 
coalitions of firms in the cartel there is no incentive to jointly defect from the cartel” (Olaizola 
2007: 224). Therefore, each firm is assumed to build expectations about deviation profits pdi based 
on the reasoning that only itself but no other firm deviates from the collusive agreement.
Assumption 8: I assume that the cartel is stabilized by a grim trigger strategy 
(Friedman 1971) with price wars (Rotemberg and Saloner 1986).
Assumption 9: I assume that the industry is infinitely lived. Respectively, the 
terminal date is uncertain.
For cartels of the above type, Friedman (1971) shows that deviations can be prevented if 
firms are sufficiently patient. This is the case if the cartelists credibly threaten potential deviators 
with reverting to the competitive equilibrium forever, once they have collected sufficient evidence 
for proving the deviation. In Assumption 6 the time for collecting this evidence is defined as one 
period. For deriving the below condition (12) for internal cartel stability, let the payoffs of the firms 
be defined as follows. The expected present value of competitive profits Vci is given by equation (9).
V ci=ci/1−   (9)
This equation rests on Assumption 3 that marginal costs follow a random walk. Therefore, firms' 
best guess about costs and profits is their current values, i.e. the conditions E(pjpi)=pjpi, E(pci)=pci, 
and E(pdi)=pdi apply. Future profits are discounted by a discount factor d=1/(1+r) with discount rate 
r. Vdi defines the present value of deviation profits of firm i.
V di=di⋅V ci   (10)
If cartelist i deviates from the collusive agreement, it enjoys deviation profits for one period only 
and is punished by a grim trigger strategy – i.e. reversion to the competitive equilibrium – in all Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -10-
subsequent periods (Friedman 1971). Equation (11) defines the present value of profits in the cartel 
Vjpi.
V jpi= jpi[P⋅V ci1−P⋅V jpi]   (11)
If firm i stays in the cartel, it makes profit pi in the current period. At the beginning of each 
following period, the cartel may be discovered by an antitrust authority with probability  P 
(Hinloopen 2006). After detection by the antitrust authority, competition in the industry is restored 
forever with firms making expected profits  pci. Fines imposed on cartelists by the competition 
authority and payment of damages are normalized to zero. Therefore, for future periods firm i 
expects to make the competitive present value of profits  Vci  after a detection by the antitrust 
authority and the collusive present value of profits Vjpi otherwise. For a cartel to be stable, the 
present value of collusive profits must be at least as great as the present value of deviation profits. 
Therefore, standard condition (12) applies.
di−jpi
di−ci
≤⋅1−P   (12)
Cost shocks change the value of profits in equation (12) and may, thus, render previously 
stable cartels unstable. In this case, firms may stabilize the cartel by engaging in price wars. These 
are defined as periods where cartelists set prices in the range above or equal to the competitive price 
and below the jointly profit maximizing price. Such price wars have, e.g., been described by Green 
and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). In 
particular, I rely on the strategy outlined by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). While they assume 
observable, i.i.d. demand shocks, my model is concerned with observable, i.i.d. cost shocks. 
Therefore, their strategy can well be applied to my modeling structure.
Equation (13) shows the strategy that firms are supposed to pursue. The upper part shows 
that firms engage in joint profit maximization when neither cartelist has an incentive to deviate 
from the collusive agreement. The lower part applies if inequality (12) is not satisfied for at least 
one firm that, thus, has an incentive to deviate from the cartel. As costs are perfectly observable (see 
Assumption 5) this incentive is anticipated by the other cartelists. Therefore, they lower their prices 
until the incentive to deviate is eliminated for every firm. 
i={









In large industries with asymmetric firms and differentiated products it is challenging even for an Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -11-
omniscient researcher to determine the set of prices that equalize the left-hand side to the right-hand 
side of equation (12). In this case, the cartel would just be stable. Calculating this set of prices is 
disparately more difficult for the (in reality imperfectly informed) firms themselves. Therefore, I 
assume cartelists to overcome this problem by explicitly coordinating on the one stable solution that 
is known to every firm, i.e. setting competitive prices. Therefore, the strategy space of the firms is 
restricted to setting either jointly profit maximizing prices (making profit pjpi) or engaging in a price 
war, i.e. setting competitive prices (making profit pci).
A simple pricing strategy of this form is also used by Fershtman and Pakes (2000: 213) for 
the same reason of computational complexity. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986: 395) note that this 
pricing strategy is similar to the one proposed by Green and Porter (1984). The decision of 
engaging in a price war is made in each period. In the following period, when firms learn about 
their new marginal costs, a new decision is made.
The above strategy yields a self-enforcing internally stable cartel. Taking the model literally, 
cartels never break down unless they are discovered by the competition authority. In case of a 
perfectly ineffective competition authority, i.e. P = 0, a cartel would stay active forever once it is 
formed. However, even in this case it does not necessarily remain effective. If cartelists are 
sufficiently asymmetric, there is often an incentive for some firm to deviate. One observes cartelists 
to play the seemingly competitive price war-strategy. When costs evolve to become more 
symmetric, the cartel becomes effective again without any change in the composition of its 
members.
2
 2.3 Cartel Formation
After describing the second stage of the game, i.e. collusive price setting, I turn to the first stage, i.e. 
the decision of the firms whether to join the cartel or remain in the competitive fringe.
Assumption 10: At some exogenously given point in time, firms meet to form a 
cartel. After its formation, the cartel is infinitely lived and perfectly stabilized by the 
pricing strategy described in section 2.2. After the establishment of cartel, there are 
2 At a first glance, one might see no need for cartelists to communicate in order to sustain the cartel. Nonetheless, the 
collusive agreement should be considered illegal. First, stabilizing the cartel requires active communication in 
agreeing on the strategy that is played in a price-war (i.e. reverting to the competitive equilibrium). Second and as is 
shown in section 2.3, the cartel is illegal because communication and coordination is needed for the establishment of 
the cartel. In this context, Spagnolo (2008: 260) points out that the property of self-enforcement is important even 
for illegal collusive agreements as “individual opportunism cannot be limited by explicit contracts enforced by the 
legal system”. Moreover, by reviewing experimental evidence Kühn (2008: 126) questions whether real tacitly 
colluding firms – without communication – would attain optimal equilibria and punishment strategies at all.Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -12-
no re-negotiations about the composition of the cartel that might affect firms' current 
participation decision.
First, to motivate the assumption of an exogenous date of cartel formation consider that conferences 
and regular meetings organized by industry associations are exogenous to the cartel but provide the 
opportunity to set up a collusive agreement. Second, assuming that no re-negotiations about the 
cartel-composition occur is a plausible assumption for many cartels. It certainly does not apply to 
all cartels. However, for reasons of conciseness modeling a game with re-negotiations must be left 
to further research.
Each firm i Î N has two pure strategies, gi = 0 to stay in the competitive fringe and make an 
expected present value of profits E(Vfi(g-i)), and gi = 1 to join the cartel and make an expected 
present value of profits E(Vi(g-i)). A cartel is formed if at least two firms decide to behave 
collusively.  g−i=g1,...,gi−1,gi1,...,gn is an (n-1)-tuple whose elements display the strategies g-i 
of the other firms. I denote the strategy space {0, 1} of firm i by Gi. A firm chooses the strategy gi 
that maximizes its payoff function hi(g).
hig=hig−i ,gi={
EV ig−i if g i=1
EV fig−i if g i=0
  (14)
In the following, I define E(Vfi(g-i)) and E(Vi(g-i)) more closely. Equation (11) implies that the 
expected present value of cartel-profits E(Vi(g-i)) of firm i is a function of its current expected cartel-
profit pi(g-i).When no price war occurs, pricing strategy (13) implies that firm i makes the jointly 
maximized profit pjpi(g-i). A price war occurs with probability Ppw. In this case, firm i only makes the 
competitive profit  pci. Therefore,the expected cartel-profit  pi(g-i) of firm  i  is expressed as the 
weighted sum of the jointly maximized profit and the competitive profit.
ig−i=1−P pw⋅ jpig−iP pw⋅ci   (15)
By plugging condition (15) into equation (11) the expected present value of cartel-profits is 
found as 
EV ig−i=
1−P pwg−i ,1⋅ jpig−iP pwg−i ,1⋅ci⋅P⋅ci/1−
1−1−P⋅
 . (16)
Ppw(g-i,1) denotes the probability of a price-war when m-1 firms other than firm i form a cartel and 
firm i participates in this cartel. If firm i remains in the fringe, the probability of a price war is 
denoted by Ppw(g-i,0). In section 3.2 I show that price wars occur more frequently in large cartels 
and, thus, reduce the effectiveness of the cartel. Therefore, the effect of firm i's participation in the 
cartel on the likeliness of price wars is an important determinant of the firm's participation-decision. Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -13-
Analogously to equation (16), the expected present value of profits in the fringe can be expressed as 
EV fig−i=
1−P pwg−i ,0⋅ fig−iP pwg−i ,0⋅ci⋅P⋅ci/1−
1−1−P⋅
 . (17)
Equations (16) and (17) may be interpreted as follows. Firms make supra-competitive profits pi(gi) 
in the cartel and pfi(gi) in the fringe, as long as the cartel remains undiscovered by the competition 
authority, which occurs with probability 1-P, and as long as no price war occurs with probability 
Ppw.
Firm i considers collusion a dominant strategy and joins the cartel with probability ji = 1 if it 
can make a higher expected present value of cartel-profits as when behaving competitively, i.e. 
condition (18) is satisfied for all possible cartel-combinations.
EV ig−i≥EV fi g−i∀ g−i   (18)
If condition (18) is satisfied for all firms, an all-inclusive cartel is formed even if firms play a pure 
strategy. This is called an externally unstable cartel (D'Aspremont et al. 1983) as firms have an 
incentive to join the cartel irrespective of its size and composition. Selten (1973: 142) and, e.g., 
Prokop (1999: 253) show that condition (18) is satisfied in sufficiently small industries.
In many other cases, it can be more profitable for a firm to remain in the competitive fringe 
rather than joining the cartel. This is especially the case when the cartel encompasses a high 
proportion of the firms in the industry. The reason for this is that large cartels provide a positive 
externality to firms outside the cartel (see Deneckere and Davidson 1985, and Stigler 1950). Fringe 
firms may increase prices under the price umbrella of the cartel and expand quantity, while cartelists 
must reduce output in order to maintain a high price-level. Therefore, it can be more profitable for 
firms to stay outside the cartel than participating in the collusive agreement. Stigler3 (1950: 25) 
provides a similar argument for mergers. Namely, that “the promoter of a merger is likely to receive 
much encouragement from each firm – almost every encouragement, in fact, except participation.” 
However, a large fringe constrains the scope of the cartelists for raising prices. In this case, it might 
have been more profitable for the firm not to join the fringe but the cartel. In the latter case, the 
price-effect of participating in the cartel would have overcompensated the required reduction in 
quantity. Therefore, under the above assumptions, cartels of a certain size can be Nash-equilibria 
even if firms employ a pure strategy (for an example see Diamantoudi (2005: 909) or section 4.2 
below).
3 Please note that the effects of a merger are similar to those of cartel-formation. In the latter case, firms simply 
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Such a Nash-equilibrium of a non-complete cartel is asymmetric even when firms are cost-
symmetric. This is because fringe-firms can be shown to make higher equilibrium-profits than 
cartel-firms. Therefore, the decision of the firms whether to form a cartel is similar to Dixit and 
Shapiro's (1986) entry game of n firms in an industry that can only sustain m of them. Applying 
Dixit and Shapiro's (1986: 64) reasoning to the cartel-formation game means that firms engage in 
some vacillation: I will regret joining the cartel if everyone else does too. But if other firms have the 
same fear and remain competitive we sacrifice profits and should rather form a (larger) cartel. 
“The point at which each firm stops this process and plunges for one choice or the other will depend 
on many factors such as the organizational structure, the time available for decision, and even the 
moods of the executives. All these involve many chance elements, and modeling the outcome as a 
mixed strategy makes sense” (Dixit and Shapiro 1986: 64).
Assumption 11: Firms are assumed to play a mixed strategy when deciding about 
their participation in the cartel (Prokop 1999).
To further motivate this assumption, I start with describing the formal structure of the game 
and, then, elaborate on its economic interpretation. Denote the set of mixed strategies of firm i by Ji 
= {ji: 0 ≤ ji  ≤ 1}, i.e. firm i joins the cartel with probability ji and remains independent with 
probability (1 – ji). This builds up confidence among firms about the establishment of a cartel but 
leaves each firm with the chance to remain in the fringe. In such an environment a perfect cartel 
may even arise when condition (18) is not satisfied for all firms. When playing such a mixed 
strategy, each firm is interested in maximizing its expected payoff Hi(j) (see equation (7) in Prokop 
(1999: 249)).

















The upper bracket in (19) is the expected present value of cartel-profits of firm i, aggregated over 
all possible compositions of the cartel and weighted by their probability of occurrence. The lower 
bracket stands for i's weighted expected present value of fringe-profits. One can think of the mixed 
strategy in the following way. At a meeting of an industry association, the sales managers of the 
firms discuss the possibility of forming a cartel. They agree on participating in the cartel with 
probability ji. However, the final decision is made by firms' CEOs, who do best to stick to the 
announced ji's, when these are equilibrium outcomes.Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -15-
In accordance with the above reasoning, the Nash equilibrium concept is applied to this 
game. A strategy n-tuple  j=  j1,...,  jn is called a Nash equilibrium if for all firms i and for all ji Î 
Ji the condition 
H i j≥H i  j− j, ji   (20)
applies where   j− j=  j1,...,  j j−1 ,  j j1 ,...,  jn . Because an equilibrium in pure strategies is a special 
case of an equilibrium in mixed strategies, this condition even applies for the case of external 
instability, where firms have an individual incentive to join the cartel. In equilibrium, each firm 
chooses a participation probability  such as to make the other firms indifferent between joining the 
cartel or remaining in the fringe. This is the case, when the weighted expected present values of 


















By choosing a higher probability, a firm would forgive some of its chance to remain in the fringe 
and benefit from the positive cartel-externality on prices. By choosing a lower probability, the 
expected cartel would be too small to make remaining in the fringe a lucrative alternative. This is 
exactly the dilemma described by Dixit and Shapiro (1986: 64).
Equilibrium-condition (21) can be simplified by subtracting the right-hand side from the 
left-hand side. By plugging in expressions (16) and (17) for the expected values of profits, the 
equilibrium-condition can be stated in terms of the known stage-game profits. Multiplying the 
resulting function by the constant 1−1−P does not affect the position of the function's root. 
Therefore, equation (22) is an alternative expression of the equilibrium-condition. By setting Ppw=0, 
equation (22) corresponds to equation (10) for symmetric firms without price wars in Prokop (1999:
 250).






1− j−i ⋅ { [ jpig−i− fig−i]   
P pwg−i ,1 ⋅ [ci− jpig−i]   
P pwg−i ,0 ⋅ [ fig−i−ci] } = 0
  (22)
Result 1: The participation decision of a firm does not directly depend on the 
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In the Nash-equilibrium, condition  (22)  must apply for all firms. Therefore, the Nash-
equilibrium is determined by the set of participation probabilities  j   that constitutes the global 






In the Nash-equilibrium, i.e. the global minimum of Y, the condition  j=0  applies. To see this, 
consider that squaring yi does not affect the root of function Y but prevents that positive values of 
yi for firm i and negative values of y-i for some firm -i sum up to zero. Taking the sum of these 
squared terms ensures that a proposed solution  j  constitutes a Nash-equilibrium for all firms. If 
some firm considers participation in the cartel a dominant strategy (i.e. equation (18) applies) one 
can pre-assign this firm a probability of   ji=1 . Firms of this type need not be considered in the 
calculation of other firms' optimal strategy. Therefore, an indicator-variable gi is defined that takes a 
value of 1 if some firm i considers cartel-participation a dominant strategy and a value of zero 
otherwise.
Defining this objective function is one of the main contributions of this article. This is 
because previous literature defines functions of this type for Nash-Cournot equilibria in pure 
strategies only (see, e.g., Beck et al. (2007), Contreras et al. (2004), Vorobeychik and Wellmann 
(2008) or Protopapas et al. (2010)). I argue that, from a computational point of view, determining a 
set of optimal participation probabilities is quite similar to the determination of a set of optimal 
output-quantities. Therefore, both problems can also be addressed by similar solution techniques as 
is shown in section 4.
 3 PARAMETERIZING THE ECONOMIC MODEL
The main objective of this paper is to determine asymmetric firms' optimal probability of joining a 
cartel (see section  4). Prokop (1999: 252) analyzes the optimal participation probabilities of 
symmetric firms. His case is not too complex, as there is just one way for firms to be symmetric and 
only one optimal participation probability applies to all firms. Even this model is so difficult that it 
requires a solution by numerical simulation (Prokop 1999: 253). In contrast, firms may be 
asymmetric in infinitely many ways, which requires a determination of an optimal participation 
probability for each and every firm. Therefore, the asymmetric game also requires a numerical 
solution. Section 3.1 is concerned with describing the parametrization of firms' cost-function.
As can be seen from equation (22), the (expected) price war probability is an important 
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trade-off two effects. First, by joining the cartel, firm i makes price wars more likely and lowers the 
share of jointly maximized profits in expected cartel-profits (see equation  (15)). Second, by 
remaining in the fringe, firm i causes prices and profits to remain closer to their competitive levels. 
In section 3.2, I provide a method for numerically obtaining proxies of the price war probability for 
all possible cartel-combinations in particular industries. These proxies are used as input parameters 
for obtaining firms' optimal probabilities of participation in a cartel. This is shown in section 4. As 
the above model allows for analyzing the determinants of the occurrence of price wars, I 
additionally provide an economic analysis of these effects in section 3.2.
 3.1 Parameterizing Marginal Costs
Assumption 3 states that marginal costs are (i) firm-specific and (ii) follow a random walk. A cost-
function with these features is defined in this section. Marginal costs of firm i, i.e. ci,t, are generated 
according to equation (24) in conjunction with conditions (25) and (26). 
ci,t={
a1⋅a2i ,t⋅st if t=1








a4 ∈ ]0;1[ }
  (25)
st ∈ {





ci,t−1] if t1   (26)
The base level of marginal costs, i.e. in the initial period t = 1, is determined as the percentage a1 of 
the variable n, which is closely related to goods' reservation price. Cost-asymmetry among firms is 
modeled by adding a firm-specific term a2i,tst to the base level of marginal costs. 
The asymmetry-term has the following features. First, the multiplicative, firm-specific 
technology-parameter a2i,t is drawn randomly from a censored normal distribution in the interval 
[a3;1]. The expected value E(a2i,t) is the mean of the interval [a3;1]. Second, a realization of a2i,t is 
drawn in every period so that the asymmetry across firms changes over time. Third, the variance m
-2 
of the technology-parameter a2i,t is assumed to depend on the product differentiation parameter m.
Assumption 12: The variance of marginal costs is modeled to decrease in the degree 
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To motivate this assumption, consider that homogeneous products are produced by similar 
production technologies and, thus, at the same cost. If production costs differed, the less efficient 
firms would want to exit the industry. This process of convergence is assumed to have occurred in 
the past and, thus, is beyond the scope of the model. Product differentiation has two effects. On the 
one hand, differentiated products may require more diverse production technologies that cause 
differing costs of production. On the other hand, consumers' preference for differentiated products 
helps to sustain differences in production costs. The assumed distribution of a2i,t does not entirely 
prevent the generation of industries, where some firms would want to exit the industry. Such 
industries are discarded and do not enter the below analyses.
Cost shocks st are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution in the interval provided by 
equation (26). a4 Î [0;1] determines the amplitude of cost-shocks. Setting a4 = 0 gives marginal 
costs that are symmetric across firms and constant over time. This interval ensures that marginal 
costs cannot become negative.
As in Harrington (2008: 241) marginal costs are assumed to follow a random walk in 
subsequent periods, i.e. t > 1. Thus, in every period t a random, scaled shock term st is added to last 
period's marginal costs of each firm i. The marginal cost-shock st is the same for all firms and may 
be considered a fluctuation in input prices. It is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution in the 
interval  [−a4⋅minici,t−1;a4⋅minici,t−1] , where minici,t−1 is the minimum (over all firms i) 
of last period's marginal costs. This ensures that marginal costs cannot become negative.
To summarize, the sign of the composite cost-shock a2i,tst is the same for all firms, because 
they produce substitute products with similar inputs. As these goods are imperfect substitutes, the 
production technology and, thus, the absolute value of the composite cost-shock differ across firms.
Using three fundamental input parameters, i.e. a1, a3, and a4, for specifying the cost function 
must not be considered overly rich. This is because the application of three choice parameters is the 
most parsimonious way for generating a whole variety of different industries and simulate data on 
collusive and competitive behavior. This data may be used for evaluations of empirical methods that 
were proposed for the detection and prosecution of cartels. Paha (2010) is primarily concerned with 
such evaluations. With regard to firms' decision whether to participate in a cartel, only parameters a1 
and a3 are found to have a decisive effect. Concerning the effectiveness of a cartel, it can be nicely 
seen from Table 2 below that a high level of marginal costs (a1 is close to 1) and a more asymmetric 
evolution of costs (low values for a3) reduces the effectiveness of a cartel by making price wars 
more likely. a4 neither has a decisive effect on the decision of the firms whether to participate in a 
cartel nor on the effectiveness of a cartel.Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -19-
 3.2 Assessing the Probability of a Price War
In the above model, price wars arise naturally on the equilibrium-path of a cartel. They occur in 
order to prevent deviations from the collusive agreement. Cartels that are stabilized by frequent 
price wars may be considered rather ineffective. Therefore, let the ineffectiveness of a cartel be 
measured by its probability of entering a price war Ppw. Equation (15) illustrates that ineffective 
cartels (i.e.  Ppw  is high) do not generate much excess profits in comparison to a competitive 
situation. Therefore, the decision of firm i whether to join a cartel is a function of its collusive 
excess profits. This makes the participation decision depend on the price war probability Ppw, as can 
be seen from equation (22). Even the fringe-profits of a firm depend on the effectiveness of the 
cartel, because fringe-firms can only enjoy supra-competitive profits when the cartel is effective.
Consequently, when determining firms' optimal participation probabilities it is necessary to 
build expectations about the likely size of Ppw. Therefore, this section proceeds as follows. First, I 
present an approach for numerically determining price war probabilities in specific industries and 
cartels. These values are used in section 4 for determining firms' optimal probabilities of cartel-
participation. Second, I analyze the economic determinants of Ppw. On the one hand, this is done by 
analyzing a sample-industry.  On the other hand, I infer additional knowledge by econometrically 
analyzing the occurrence of price wars in 50,000 randomly generated industries.
I start with describing the method that is used to calculate a numerical proxy of Ppw for each 
possible cartel-composition in a particular industry. In particular, I calculate a numerical proxy of 
Ppw for each possible cartel-composition in an industry. For doing so, I use equation (24) to generate 
200 vectors of firms' marginal costs. Then, I evaluate for each combination of marginal costs and 
each possible composition of cartels, whether some cartelist would find it profitable to deviate from 
the cartel. In an asymmetric industry 2
n different market structures can arise. Of those, n-1 are non-
collusive because less than one firm decides to join the cartel. Each collusive market structure is 
assigned a price war probability Ppw equaling the frequency of observed price wars relative to the 
200 simulated situations. 
Using a number of 200 different combinations of marginal costs appears reasonable as this 
yields quite accurate predictions of Ppw. On the other hand, it leaves the computational burden at 
acceptable levels. To illustrate this trade-off between accuracy and computation-time, consider that 
for, e.g., n=10 firms one has to compute one competitive and 1013 collusive market outcomes. For 
each collusive market outcome, one needs to determine the incentive to deviate for on average 
about 5 cartelists. This is repeated 200 times. Therefore, one has to calculate about 1m equilibria of 
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After having presented the method for calculating a proxy of Ppw, I continue with a brief 
economic analysis of the determinants of price wars. In doing so, I resort to two types of analysis. 
First, I analyze firms' incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement in a particular collusive 
industry. This incentive is mitigated by price wars. Second, I infer additional knowledge from an 
econometric analysis of 50,000 different industries.
Cartelists engage in a price war if (at collusive prices) at least one cartel firm finds it 
profitable to deviate from the collusive agreement, i.e. inequality (12) is violated.
Result 2:  Inequality  (12)  indicates that a higher discount rate  r  and a higher 
probability of detection by the competition authority P c.p. destabilize cartels.
The profits at the left-hand side of condition (12) are complex terms. Theoretically, an analytical 
expression for these profits can be determined from the expressions of firms' prices and quantities 
(4)-(7). In practice, deriving an analytical expression of the left-hand side of stability condition (12) 
is far from trivial. However, further inferences on the determinants of the effectiveness of cartels 
can be drawn from the graphical analysis of a particular industry as is shown in the following.
Of particular importance is the effect of the relative cartel size m/n and product homogeneity 
m. Figure 1 displays the effect of m and m/n for an industry with ten symmetric firms and marginal 
costs ci=n/4. On the vertical axis it maps the value of the left-hand side of inequality (12), i.e. the 
critical discount factor of the firms. The gray pane displays the right-hand side of (12), i.e. (1-P)/
(1+r), for P=0.25 and r=0.10. Cartelists do not have an incentive to deviate from cartels where the 
gray pane lies above the critical discount factor. Interpreting Figure 1 yields the below results.
Figure 1: Condition (12) for ten symmetric firmsJohannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -21-
Result 3: When the cartel controls a  small  share of the market, greater product 
homogeneity increases the effectiveness of the cartel.
This is because in case of a small cartel the strong competitive fringe constrains the scope of the 
cartelists for raising prices. Therefore, neither the jointly maximized profits pjpi of the firms nor 
their deviation profits pdi exceed competitive profits pci much. Greater product homogeneity lowers 
competitive profits and, thus, makes punishment harsher relative to the gain from deviating.
Result 4: When the cartel controls a  large  share of the market, greater product 
homogeneity decreases the effectiveness of the cartel.
Therefore, the absolute value of deviation profits is high because, in the case of a large cartel, the 
competitive fringe is weak. Moreover, the short-run gain from deviation (pdi – pjpi) is higher for 
more homogeneous goods than for rather differentiated products.  This is because firms win a larger 
share of the market when deviating from a cartel for more homogeneous products than by deviating 
from a cartel for quite differentiated products. The reason for this is the customers' preference for 
variety which cannot be overcome by simply lowering one's price.
These two effects have also been identified by Ross (1992) who, however, does not control 
for cartel-size. In analogy to Ross (1992), I find that the short-run gain from deviation is smaller for 
homogeneous goods than for mildly differentiated products. In contrast to Ross (1992), I find that 
this effect does not raise the stability of an all-inclusive cartel in a market for homogeneous 
products over its stability in a market for differentiated products. In my model, raising product 
homogeneity m lowers the numerator of inequality (12) less strongly than the denominator. 
Result 3 and Result 4 are in line with the below Probit-regression. A further result can be 
formulated for the impact of relative cartel-size on the effectiveness of the collusive agreement.
Result 5: Figure 1 shows that a price war is more likely if the cartel is larger (higher 
relative cartel-size m/n) and, thus, harder to coordinate (see, e.g., Kühn (2008: 115) 
or Levenstein and Suslow (2006: 58)).
Two additional results (Result 6 and Result 7) cannot easily be inferred from a graph like 
Figure 1. They are derived from a Probit-regression as shown in the following. Porter (1985) 
suggests to infer the probability of a price war Ppw from a Probit-regression that relates a variable 
PW (with PW = 1 if a price war occurred and PW = 0 otherwise) to relevant industry- and cartel-
characteristics. Examples of these are (i) supply-side characteristics (e.g., the number of firms, the 
degree of product homogeneity, firms' discount rate), (ii) demand-side characteristics, (iii) firms' 
production technology (e.g., cost variables), and (iv) cartel characteristics (e.g., the fraction of Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -22-
cartelists, the probability of detection by the competition authority). The numerical nature of the 
above model makes it easy to apply such a regression approach for analyzing the determinants of 
cartel-stability.
I start with using the simulation model to randomly generate a cross-sectional dataset of 
50,000 different collusive industries, i.e. I generate firm-level data at a single point in time.4 
Industries' characteristics are drawn randomly from the intervals given in Table 1.
5 At this point of 
the analysis, firms' optimal participation probabilities  j have not yet been determined. Therefore, 
the identity of cartelists and fringe-firms is determined randomly with each firm being assigned a 
probability m/n of participating in the cartel. Treating the cartel formation game as a game in mixed 
strategies there is a finite probability that the chosen cartel would be observed. As described in 
section 2.2, price wars are elements of the equilibrium-strategy for stabilizing cartels. Therefore, the 
observed industry-outcomes are equilibrium-outcomes. It is observed and stored in variable PW 
whether in the observed period a price war occurred in the observed industries (PW = 1) or not (PW 
= 0). A price war occurs in about 21% of the modeled cartels.
n m n m a1 a3 a4 P r
Lower boundary 3 2 50 0 0.05 0 0.05 0.05 0.05
Upper boundary 20 n 150 100 0.9 1 0.15 0.4 0.25
Table 1: Intervals of Industry Characteristics
After generating the data, PW is regressed on firm- and industry-characteristics (i)-(iv) using 
a Probit-regression. The results of this regression are presented in Table 2. The McFadden-R² of the 
regression is 82.31%. All coefficients are statistically significant (based on a z-test) at the 1%-
significance level.
4 The below Probit-regression has also been done for 5,000 simulated industries which does not decisively affect the 
regression coefficients and significance levels.
5 An economic explanation for the choice of these interval-borders is provided in Appendix B. Additionally, some 
literature (see, e.g., Li and Winker 2003) indicates that such a Monte Carlo approach for generating sample-
industries might be outperformed by a quasi-Monte Carlo method where industries are generated deterministically. 
This is done for populating the space of industry characteristics more equally. Using such an advanced method 
appears not necessary in this context. This is because the results obtained when using the simpler Monte-Carlo 
method perfectly match the above theoretical results. Moreover, slight imbalances in the numerical value of the 
estimated coefficients do not affect the outcome of the model as these results are not used for any further 
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constant m/n (m/n)² (m/n)=1 m ln(m) (m/n)ln(m) c/n (c/n)² r P sc/c m · sc/c
Probit-b -3.597 -22.371 19.739 0.995 -0.018 -0.283 1.782 -4.64 7.387 6.409 10.21 51.682 11.475
Table 2: Parameter Values and Probit Regression
Because the below analysis only concentrates on the sign of the estimated coefficients, I do not 
calculate marginal effects. The regression shows that the economic model (see section  2) in 
conjunction with the assumptions on marginal costs (see section 3.1) gives economically sensible 
results as it confirms the above results 2-5. Only the effect of the relative cartel-size on the 
effectiveness of the agreement cannot that nicely be seen from the above Probit-regression, as the 
coefficient of the size-variable m/n is negative. However, the coefficient of (m/n)² is positive so that 
the overall effect is positive for m/n>57%. This is because of the regression's inadequacy to capture 
the economic model's non-linearities. In addition, the Probit-regression provides two further 
findings that cannot easily be inferred from a graph like Figure 1.
Result 6: Firms have a higher incentive to deviate from a cartel when the marginal 
costs of production are close to consumers' prohibitive price. This is measured by the 
ratio of average marginal costs c to variable n.
Result 7: The propensity to engage in a price war is higher if the costs of the firms 
are more asymmetric. Asymmetry is measured by the variation-coefficient of 
marginal costs, i.e. the standard deviation of marginal costs sc divided by their mean 
c.
 4 SOLVING AND ANALYZING THE ASYMMETRIC FORMATION-GAME
In section 2.3, I show that the set of participation probabilities  j , which globally minimizes the 
function Y(j) (see equation (23)), coincides with the  Nash-equilibrium of asymmetric firms' cartel-
formation game. Determining  j  is a non-trivial problem because an analytical expression of Y(j) is 
quite complex and is hard to solve for  j . Hence, Prokop (1999) determines the Nash-equilibria 
numerically even for the simpler problem of symmetric firms without price wars. Therefore, I also 
obtain numerical solutions for the cartel-formation game of asymmetric firms with price wars.
One possibility for determining the global minimum of  Y(j) is to evaluate all possible 
combinations of participation probabilities. This is a so-called complete enumeration algorithm. 
Such a search is very costly in terms of computation time and, thus, is not favorable. To see this, 
suppose that participation probabilities
6 could only take integer values in the interval [0;100], and 
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the number of firms in the industry was ten. On a standard desktop computer
7 it takes about 1 
minute to calculate the value of Y(j) for 10
5 different j-vectors. Therefore, it would take about 1.9bn 
years to calculate the value of  Y(j) for the 10010 possible combinations of participation probabilities 
and select  j . This is quite some time.
In section 4.1, I show that the Nash-equilibrium of ten asymmetric firms' cartel formation-
game is found by a Differential Evolution (DE) stochastic optimization heuristic in about 15 
minutes at the precision of floating numbers. The idea of this algorithm is to start with a random set 
of different candidate vectors of participation probabilities and calculate the objective function 
values  Y(j) of these candidates. In a second step, new  j-vectors are generated by combining 
elements of the old ones. A new vector replaces an old one if the new j-vector yields a better – i.e. 
lower – value of  Y(j). By concentrating on the evaluation of promising candidate vectors, the 
algorithm converges to the optimum of Y(j). This causes the algorithm to be much faster than the 
complete enumeration.
In section  4.2, I show that large firms benefit more from collusion than small firms. 
However, small firms choose a higher probability of entering a cartel than large firms. At first sight, 
this result may seem counterintuitive. At second sight, the logic of this results becomes pretty clear, 
as it is driven by the strategic reasoning of the firms. The more firms stay in the competitive fringe, 
the lower are profits both in the cartel and in the fringe. Therefore, large firms choose a small 
participation probability. This imposes a threat on their small competitors, who anticipate the cartel 
and, thus, expected profits in the fringe to be small. That way, collusion becomes more profitable 
relative to staying in the fringe, and small firms choose a somewhat higher participation probability. 
In section 4.2, these points are illustrated in greater detail.
 4.1 Determining Equilibria by a Differential Evolution Heuristic Search Algorithm
To my knowledge, Beck et al. (2007) provide the first contribution to determining Nash-equilibria 
of complex games by means of algorithmic optimization. I extend this literature by showing that the 
global minimum of equation (23) constitutes the Nash-equilibrium of the cartel-formation game and 
may be found by a stochastic search algorithm. As is standard in the optimization-literature, I refer 
to this function Y(j) as the objective function.
The basic idea of a stochastic search algorithm is to start at a random point in the search 
space (i.e. a candidate vector of participation probabilities) and converge towards the minimum of 
7 All evaluations were done on a PC running with 32-bit Windows Vista on a Intel Core2-architecture (3.00 Mhz) and 
4 GB RAM. All programs were executed in Matlab version 7.7.0. I will be happy to provide the Matlab-files on 
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the objective function. This is done by iteratively examining and refining further points in the 
search space. The selection of these further candidate solutions is done on basis of two ideas. The 
first idea is that the optimum should have some similarity to features of good points, which have 
been examined throughout the search. The second idea is that, by concentrating on these good, 
known candidate solutions, one might miss further good points. Therefore, the search of an 
optimum should be performed to some extent randomly in the vicinity of good candidate solutions. 
There are two alternatives to performing a stochastic search. These are using (i) a complete 
enumeration algorithm or (ii) a deterministic search algorithm.
A complete enumeration algorithm evaluates all possible candidate solutions. In the 
introduction to section 4, I argue that such a search is not favorable because it is very costly in terms 
of computation time. Therefore, the global optimum of the objective function should rather be 
obtained by a deterministic or stochastic optimization algorithm.  The decisive advantage of 
stochastic search algorithms over deterministic search algorithms is their ability to overcome local 
optima in the search space. As the exact shape of the objective function is unknown for this n-
dimensional problem, I use a Differential Evolution (DE) stochastic optimization algorithm (Storn 
and Price (1997) for determining the optimum of objective function (23). Below, I provide an 
intuitive description of DE. A more technical description of the DE-implementation as used in this 
article is provided in Appendix A.
  Additionally,  DE is  advantageous  as  the generation of new  candidate solutions  is 
computationally quite efficient. Some prior evaluations  indicate that a deterministic search 
algorithm, i.e. the method of steepest descent, often converges to the same optima as the below DE-
algorithm. However, in the remaining cases the method of steepest descent has a tendency to end up 
in suboptimal corner-solutions (i.e. 0% or 100% participation probabilities for all firms). Moreover, 
for generating new candidate solutions it requires the calculation of the objective function's 
gradient-vector, which imposes some computational burden. This burden cannot necessarily be 
overcompensated by a reduction in the number of candidate solutions which must be evaluated for 
converging sufficiently close to the objective function's optimum. To summarize, DE appears to be 
more effective in finding the global optimum. Moreover, when fixing the computation time DE has 
a tendency to provide more accurate results than an algorithm searching for the steepest descent. 
Future research should be directed at (i) exploring the features of the objective function and (ii) 
fine-tuning a deterministic search method to the characteristics of this particular problem.
Additionally, within the group of stochastic search algorithms, DE seems to be suited 
particularly well to the determination of the global minimum of objective function (23). This result 
is attained by challenging DE by a Threshold Accepting (TA) algorithm. I find that DE yields Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -26-
solutions with lower, i.e. better, objective function values than TA. TA as initially proposed by 
Dueck and Scheuer (1990) is chosen as a relevant alternative to DE because it is a variant of 
simulated annealing (SA). SA is found by Vorobeychik and Wellmann (2008: 1055) to be a good 
“general-purpose Nash equilibrium approximation technique[s] for infinite games”. 
After having explained the choice of a DE-algorithm, I intuitively describe the functioning 
of the algorithm. DE belongs to the group of evolutionary algorithms. These algorithms consider 
different candidate solutions, i.e. vectors of participation probabilities  j, to be the DNA of 
individuals within a population. The members of a population mate and pass on some part of their 
DNA (i.e. the participation probabilities of some firms) to their offsprings. This process is called 
crossover. In case of DE, an offspring is generated from four parents. First, the difference of two 
candidate solutions' participation probabilities is scaled by a predefined scaling factor F. A so called 
mutant vector  is  generated by adding  the scaled difference to  the vector of participation 
probabilities of a third individual. Second, some elements (i.e. firms' participation probabilities) of a 
fourth so called target vector are replaced with some predefined probability (i.e. the crossover rate 
CR) by the corresponding elements of the mutant vector. Mutation ensures that genetic diversity is 
not restricted to the DNA, i.e. the participation probabilities, in the starting population. If the 
objective function value of the generated offspring (the so-called trial vector) is lower (i.e. better) 
than that of the target vector (the parent), the offspring enters the new generation. Otherwise, the 
parent enters the new generation. This process of mutation and recombination is repeated for a 
predefined number of generations G. Because only the fittest individuals enter a new generation, the 
algorithm converges towards the global minimum of the objective function. Such a convergence 
does not mean that the algorithm perfectly attains the global optimum in every run. Nonetheless, it 
is shown below that the DE-algorithm arrives at the optimum both effectively and reliably. 
 Appendix B provides details on this evaluation.
For being effective, the DE-algorithm must converge to the global minimum of objective 
function (23). For being reliable, it must do so irrespective of its starting conditions. DE is shown to 
satisfy these two criteria by evaluating its convergence in twenty randomly generated industries, 
using five different starting populations. Ten of these industries are characterized by symmetric 
firms. In the remaining ten industries, firms are asymmetric. The characteristics of the industries are 
drawn randomly within the bounds provided by Table 1. The number of firms n is restricted to the 
interval [11;13]. This keeps computation times at reasonable levels. The algorithm is run with 
CR=0.9, F=0.8, G=5,000 generations in the symmetric cases, and G=15,000 in the more complex, 
asymmetric cases.
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irrespective of its starting-population. These solutions are characterized by objective function values 
lower than 10
-31. As these values are sufficiently close to zero, a proposed solution may be 
considered the Nash-equilibrium of the cartel-formation game. As expected, the DE-algorithm 
returns (almost) identical participation probabilities for all symmetric firms. For further evaluating 
the quality of these solutions, I calculate the variation coefficient of firms' participation probabilities 
obtained in the five runs of the algorithm. None of these variation coefficients takes a value higher 
than 10
-14. This small variation is economically insignificant and may be attributed to the stochastic 
nature of the search.
For three out of the ten asymmetric industries, DE attains equally good results. In the seven 
remaining industries, DE converges to the same optimum in all runs but does not always exactly 
arrive there. To provide an example, the algorithm might return an optimal participation probability 
for a particular firm of 44.73% in one run and of 44.67% in another run. From the viewpoint of 
optimization-theory, this leaves room for further improvements of the algorithm. From the 
viewpoint   of   economics,   the   economic   interpretation   of   these   participation   probabilities   is 
practically the same. In summary, one finds that determining the optimum of objective function Y(j) 
for asymmetric firms imposes a greater burden on DE as in the case of symmetric firms. This 
requires the researcher to increase the number of generations G and/or to fine-tune the parameter 
CR and F more thoroughly when applying DE to an asymmetric industry.
Result 8: The Differential Evolution stochastic search algorithm is an appropriate 
means for determining the global minimum of objective function (23) and, thus, the 
Nash-equilibrium of the cartel-formation game.
 4.2 The Economics of the Formation Equilibrium
This section analyzes the decision of firms whether to join a cartel. My research supports the 
hypothesis that small firms have a higher probability of joining the cartel although large firms have 
a higher benefit from collusion than small firms. First, I derive this hypothesis from the analysis of 
a particular industry. Second, I randomly generate 95 asymmetric industries and apply the DE-
algorithm for determining firms' optimal participation probabilities. An econometric analysis of 
these participation probabilities confirms the hypothesis that small, inefficient firms choose higher 
optimal participation probabilities than large, efficient firms.
In order to illustrate the effect of asymmetries on firms' collusion-decision, I introduce a 
faint asymmetry in the sample-industry from section 3.2 and analyze the decision of these firms. 
The industry consists of n=10 firms. Firms 1-9 remain symmetric with marginal costs cl=n/4. Firm 
10 is assumed to be slightly less efficient with marginal costs ch=1.02·cl. As this implies ph>pl, firm Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -28-
10 sells less quantity and makes lower profits than firms 1-9. Hence, firm 10 is smaller than its 
more efficient competitors.
Below, I show that efficient firms prefer being in the cartel to being in the fringe even when 
the cartel is large. (However, it must not be too large.) When the cartel is large, inefficient firms 
often find it more profitable to be in the fringe than to be in the cartel. To see this, assume that firm 
i expects the other firms in the industry to behave according to the strategy-tuple g-i. Then, its profit 
in an effective cartel is pjpi(g-i), and its profit when remaining in the fringe is pfi(g-i). Firm i considers 
it individually profitable to participate in the cartel when condition (27) is satisfied.
 jpig −i − fig −i 
 jpig −i 
≥0   (27)
Figure 2 displays the value of the left-hand side of equation (27) for the efficient low-cost 
firm (solid lines) and the inefficient high-cost firm (dotted lines) for different degrees of product 
differentiation. The black lines apply for the case of m=12, and the gray ones for m=14. On the 
horizontal axis, I summarize the strategy-tuple g-i by the number of cartelists m when firm i decides 
to participate in the cartel. Displaying the value of equation (27) for only up to seven cartelists 
allows for a reasonable scaling of the figure without limiting its economic interpretation. With 
regard to the composition of the cartel, I assume that the large, low-cost firm always colludes with 
the small high-cost firm and m-2 other low-cost firms.
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I start with analyzing the effects for m=12 and comment on the differences of different 
degrees of product differentiation further below. When the number of cartelists is small (i.e. m≤5), 
both inefficient and efficient firms make higher profits in the cartel than in the fringe. In this case, 
the collusive profit of an efficient firm exceeds its profit in the fringe by 1.51%. The collusive profit 
of the inefficient firm exceeds its profit in the fringe by only 1.03%. The difference between these 
two values can be explained by the fact that the large, efficient firm achieves a particular increase in 
its price by a smaller relative reduction in its quantity than the small, inefficient firm. To see this, 
consider that the profit-maximizing increase in price when joining the cartel is about 6.4% for both 
firms. However, the efficient firm achieves the price-effect by reducing its output by only 22% 
while the inefficient firm must reduce its output by 23.2%. Therefore, collusion is more profitable 
for efficient firms.
When the cartel is large (i.e. m≥7), both firms prefer being in the fringe to being in the 
cartel. This is because a large cartel causes a perceptible increase in prices. At this elevated level of 
prices, consumers react more price-sensitive. Therefore, by joining a large cartel, a firm would have 
to reduce its output quite strongly in order to raise prices any further. In this case, it is more 
profitable for a firm to remain in the fringe and undercut the prices of the cartelists than colluding 
itself. In the above example, the inefficient firm finds it more profitable to be in the fringe when the 
cartel encompasses m≥6 firms. This is different for efficient firms who may affect market-prices 
more easily. An efficient prefers the fringe to the cartel only when the cartel is large. Given that the 
inefficient firm remains in the fringe, an inefficient firm finds it more profitable to be in the fringe 
when the cartel encompasses  m≥7  firms. Based on the analysis of this particular industry, I 
formulate Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: Collusion is more profitable for efficient firms than for inefficient 
firms. Efficient firms would want to form larger cartels than inefficient firms.
This hypothesis is perfectly in line with previous literature such as Bos and Harrington 
(2010) and Donsimoni (1985). While Bos and Harrington (2010) stress the effect of firms' size on 
their incentive to collude, Donsimoni (1985) analyzes the productive efficiency of the firms. I 
integrate both views, because in my model greater productive efficiency leads to a larger firm.
I proceed with analyzing the optimal cartel-participation probabilities of the firms in the 
above industry. It can be shown  that a cartel of five efficient firms – i.e. the fringe consists of four 
efficient and one inefficient firm – constitutes a Nash-equilibrium of the cartel-formation game even 
when firms play pure strategies. Therefore, the efficient, symmetric firms would have to play 
asymmetric strategies, because some must stay in the fringe while others collude. Consequently, it 
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the mixed-strategy Nash-equilibrium of the above industry, which is characterized by an optimal 
participation probability of    jh=86.08%   for the small, high-cost firm and a probability of
 jl=39.08% for the large, low-cost firm (and its look-alikes).  Figure 3  provides a histogram 
showing the relative frequency of cartel-sizes given these participation probabilities. 
Cartels with six members are found to be most frequent. Such cartels may also arise when firms 
play a pure strategy. However, playing a mixed strategy widens the set of cartels that may arise in 
this industry. This yields Result 9.
Result 9: By playing a mixed-strategy in the cartel-formation game, firms can create 
larger cartels than by playing pure strategies.
To see the economic meaning of this result, suppose for a moment that small and large firms 
set identical participation probabilities ji=  jh∀i . In expectation, this would generate relatively 
large cartels. Hypothesis 1 implies that, in this case, especially the small firm would (in expectation) 
find it profitable to remain in the fringe. This does not constitute a mixed-strategy Nash-equilibrium 
of the formation game. Therefore, the large firms lower their participation probability, which 
reduces the expected size of the cartel. This makes the fringe less desirable for the small firm, while 
the desirability of being in the cartel is raised. Graphically spoken, we move further to the left on 
the black, dotted line in Figure 2. This process takes place until all firms are made indifferent 
between  joining the cartel or remaining in the fringe. Based on this analysis of a particular industry, 
I formulate a second hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 2: Given Hypothesis 1, large firms choose a lower probability for joining 
a cartel than small firms.
Below in this section, I provide evidence that Hypothesis 2 also applies to industries other 
than the above example.  Note that the two above hypotheses are interrelated and must apply 
together. Therefore, showing that Hypothesis 2 applies, means showing that Hypothesis 1 also 
applies.
Before demonstrating the generalization of the above hypotheses to other industries, I show 
that the qualitative interpretation of the hypotheses does not depend on the degree of product 
differentiation.  In industries with less differentiated goods, the same effects apply but have a 
somewhat stronger impact. This can be seen from the gray lines in Figure 2. These represent the 
percentage increase in profits of being in the cartel relative to being in the fringe when the product-
differentiation parameter takes a value of m=14. In this case, the DE-algorithm returns an optimal 
participation probability of   jh=96.33%  for the high-cost firm, while the low-cost firms choose 
 jl=40.07% . These results allow for formulating two additional hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3: Collusion is more profitable in industries with similar products. Thus, 
firms choose higher participation probabilities in industries with homogeneous 
products than in industries with differentiated products.
Hypothesis 4: Product homogeneity increases the effect of cost-differences on the 
profits   of   the   firms.   This   produces   a   greater   spread   in   firms'   participation 
probabilities.
Now, I turn to the second part of this section and show that the above hypotheses apply to 
more industries than the above sample-industry. The asymmetric and complex nature of the game 
prevents analytic solutions that would allow for a mathematical proof of the hypotheses. Therefore, 
I show that the above hypotheses apply to a large number of different industries, which firmly 
supports the validity of the hypotheses. In a first step, I generate 95 industries by randomly drawing 
their characteristics within the bounds provided by Table 1.  The number of firms is determined in 
the interval from 11 to 13 firms. In a second step, I use the DE-algorithm (with  G=10,000 
generations, CR=0.9, and F=0.8) to obtain a participation probability for each firm in these 95 
industries. In a third step, the participation probabilities of the firms are regressed on firm-, cartel- 
and industry-characteristics. This is done by using a standard OLS-regression in combination with a 
moving blocks bootstrap method.8  The regression output and more details on the bootstrap-
regression method are provided in Appendix B.  With regard to its economic interpretation, the 
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regression provides the following central results.
Result 10: Firms with below-average marginal costs choose lower participation 
probabilities than firms with above-average marginal costs. This substantiates the 
above hypotheses 1 and 2.
Result 11: The effect of cost-dispersion on firms' participation probabilities becomes 
more pronounced the more similar the products of the firms are. This effect provides 
evidence for the validity of hypothesis 4.
Result   12:  The   propensity   of   firms   to   collude   is   higher   in   industries   with 
homogenous   products   than   in   industries   with   differentiated   products.   This 
substantiates hypothesis 3.
Result 13: The participation decision of a firm depends indirectly, i.e. via the effect 
of the price war probability Ppw, on the effectiveness of the competition authority P 
and on the discount rate r. Higher values of these variables imply lower participation 
probabilities.
 5 CONCLUSION
In this article, I show how to simulate oligopolistic industries with differentiated products and 
asymmetric firms. A particular feature of this simulation model is that each firm may endogenously 
decide whether it prefers to compete or to collude. The decision about forming a cartel is made at an 
exogenously determined point in time. Both features, asymmetric firms and endogenous cartel 
formation, are elements that have not been explored extensively elsewhere.
The decision of the firms whether to form a cartel is modeled as a game in mixed strategies. 
This modeling assumption is made because in many cases it is more profitable for an individual 
firm to have others form the cartel and remain independent rather than joining the cartel. Thus, in 
pure strategies no cartel or only a small cartel is formed. Randomizing the participation decision of 
the firms widens their set of strategies. This greater variety of strategies (i.e. this mixed strategy) is 
a decisive element that motivates firms to form larger cartels than they would create when playing a 
pure strategy only.
In the Nash-equilibrium, every firm chooses a probability of participating in the cartel such 
as to make its rivals indifferent between joining the collusive agreement and remaining in the 
fringe. As a consequence, in equilibrium no firm has a systematic preference for staying in the 
fringe and, thus, free-riding on the cartel. Large firms, i.e. firms with below-average marginal costs, 
are found to choose lower participation probabilities than small, cost-inefficient firms. This result is Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -33-
interesting because in terms of profits large, efficient firms gain more from colluding (relative to 
staying in the fringe) than small, inefficient firms. This result on profits has also been shown by 
previous research. To my knowledge, I am the first to show that efficient firms should nonetheless 
choose a low probability of colluding. This is for strategic reasons. If the efficient firms chose  high 
participation probabilities and, thus, showed a massive interest in colluding, the inefficient firms 
would find it individually profitable to stay in the competitive fringe and free-ride on the cartel's 
increased price-level. This behavior is harmful for cartelists. Hence, large firms choose a low 
participation probability for motivating their small rivals to join the cartel. The effect of dispersion 
in firms' participation probabilities becomes more pronounced when firms offer quite similar 
products.
These findings on the optimal participation probabilities are the central economic results of 
my paper. They are derived from a model that is, on the one hand, firmly grounded in economic 
theory while, on the other hand, being innovative with regard to the modeling of firm-size and cost-
dynamics. First, firm-size is a result of cost-efficient production. Being productively efficient allows 
for setting lower prices and attracting more customers as compared to cost-inefficient firms. Thus, 
the model does not require an exogenous capacity-parameter for modeling firm-size. Second, as 
marginal costs are assumed to be subject to cost-shocks, they evolve over time. This dynamic 
structure leads to a variation of prices over time and triggers price wars in a cartel. In other models, 
this is modeled by assuming exogenous shocks to demand. Third, specifying marginal costs in the 
above way allows for numerical solutions of the cartel participation game. This is convenient as the 
asymmetry of the firms prevents an analytical solution of this game.
The Nash-equilibrium of the participation game is determined as the minimum of an 
objective function. Formulating this function is the main technical contribution of this paper. 
Moreover, I show that the minimum of the objective function can be obtained by a Differential 
Evolution stochastic optimization algorithm at reasonable computational cost. Econometrically 
analyzing optimization results yields the above finding that large, efficient firms have a lower 
probability of joining the cartel than small, inefficient firms.
The objective function shows that in the above model the participation decision of the firms 
does not directly depend on the effectiveness of the competition authority or the discount rate. First, 
this is because the relative profitability of being in the fringe – in comparison to participating in the 
cartel – is not affected by the value of the discount rate. Second, in this model without fines, an 
effective competition authority can only render the cartel ineffective but may not put the cartelists in 
a situation with profits below their competitive profits. Hence, the competition authority does not 
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However, the participation decision of the firms indirectly depends on the discount rate and 
the effectiveness of the competition authority, because both parameters affect the probability that 
the cartelists engage in a price war. More frequent price wars make the cartel less effective and, 
thus, affect the participation decision of the firms. In the above model, I find that the probability of 
a price war rises in both firms' discount rate and the probability of detection by the competition 
authority. Consequently, both factors have an indirect negative effect on the firms' participation 
probabilities.
In addition to prior research, I find that cartels with a small combined market share are the 
more effective the more similar goods they offer. This is because a large competitive fringe strongly 
constrains the cartel's effectiveness when firms offer homogeneous goods. Therefore, a deviation 
from the small cartel is not very profitable, either. However, when the cartel controls a large share 
of the market it is least effective in industries for homogeneous goods. This is because a large cartel 
raises prices much. This makes a deviation quite profitable. Moreover, by deviating a cartelist wins 
a   higher   additional   market   share   in   markets   for   homogenous   goods   than   in   markets   for 
differentiated goods.
Future research should be devoted to broadening the variety of effects that is covered by the 
model. Here, one may think of allowing the competition authority to set fines, with colluders being 
able to apply for leniency, and consumers having the opportunity to claim damages. Entry and exit 
of firms may be endogenized. Also, demand shocks and/or business cycles may be modeled. 
Additionally, one might relax the assumption of cartelists setting either competitive or jointly profit 
maximizing prices. It will be interesting to determine the set of maximum sustainable prices that 
just  stabilizes the collusive agreement. Moreover, the model might be advanced in order to 
endogenize the time of cartelization, i.e. to predict when a cartel will be formed. In the existing 
model, cartel-firms do not have the chance to join the fringe after the establishment of the cartel. 
Similarly, fringe-firms may not belatedly join the cartel. Allowing for such changes in the cartel's 
structure   may   have   an   effect   on   the   initial   participation-decision   of   the   firms.   From   the 
methodological side, more research needs to be done in the area of determining the Nash-equilibria 
of this game by optimization methods. In particular, further fine-tuning of Differential Evolution or 
other optimization techniques may improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the search for Nash-
equilibria.Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -35-
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APPENDICES
 Appendix A The Differential Evolution Algorithm
The Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm that is used in this article is a variant of DE as proposed by Storn and Price 
(1997). The features of this specific algorithm are detailed in the following.
Each candidate solution is characterized by its vector of  participation probabilities j. As suggested by Rainer 
Storn
9 the size of a population NP is predefined to be 10 times the number of parameters, i.e. the number of firms n in 
the industry of interest. The number of generations G is selected by the researcher as well as the crossover probability 
CR and the scaling factor F. Ad-hoc evaluations indicate that results obtained by DE with different parameter settings 
are not miles apart. The focus of this article is on economically meaningful results rather than obtaining them most 
efficiently. Therefore, the number of generations is generally set at relatively high levels. It is left to further research to 
fine-tune the search algorithm in order to obtain results with the same precision but fewer iterations, i.e. less 
computation time. A pseudocode of DE is provided below.
 The search is started (1:) by generating a population GGc of candidate vectors jg whose elements, i.e. firms' 
participation probabilities, are randomly chosen within the interval [0;1]. Then, the fitness (i.e. the objective function 
value) is computed for all candidates. Each individual  jg  now conceives an offspring by mating with three other 
members ji1, ji2, and ji3 (with g ¹ i1 ¹ i2 ¹ i3) of the population. This is done by, first generating a mutant vector jm (7:) 
from ji1, ji2, and ji3 according to equation (28).
jm= ji1⋅  ji2− ji3   (28)
The factor f controls the amplification of the differential variation. In Storn and Price (1997: 344) f is a constant. Here, 
it is a random number that is determined from the interval [0.9F;1.1F] with E(f) = F. This somewhat altered version of 
DE enables the algorithm to generate slight changes in the differential variation. Therefore, the elements in the mutant 
vector are somewhat more diverse as in the case of a standard DE-algorithm.
In a second step, a trial vector jng is generated (11:) by replacing participation probabilities in the target vector 
jg by the corresponding elements in the mutant vector jm. Each element is replaced with probability CR. Putting it in 
technical terms, the replacement is done if a random number is generated from the interval [0;1] that is smaller than CR. 
The algorithm is designed such that jg ¹ jng is ensured. The trial vector enters the following population GGn if its fitness 
is better (i.e. its objective function value is lower) than that of the (old) target vector. Otherwise, the target vector jg 
enters GGn. These steps are repeated for all candidate vectors in a population over G generations. Finally, the solution 
with the lowest objective function value is returned.
It turns out that the effectiveness of the algorithm can be increased by selecting  ji1, ji2, and ji3 according to their 
fitness. This is tested by comparing the performance (i.e. the obtained solution's objective function value when fixing 
the number of generations NP) of the above DE-algorithm with and without the fitness-based selection for several 
industries. To illustrate the fitness-based generation of offsprings, let jrr denote the candidate vectors in the current 
population GGc with the index rr = 1, ..., NP denoting their rank. As an example, jrr with rr=1 is the candidate vector 
with the lowest fitness. Then the probability PSrr of selecting jrr as one of  ji1, ji2, or ji3 is denoted by equation (29).




   (29)
If the target vector and the mutant vector are identical they can only produce an identical offspring. In this 
case, the mutant vector jm is replaced by the mean of every firm's participation probabilities across all candidate vectors 
in the current generation (9:). If all candidate solutions in the current generation are identical the first candidate vector is 
replaced (4:) by a vector whose elements are randomly generated from the interval [0;1].
In case of symmetric firms candidate solutions with identical participation probabilities are needed. DE's task 
to generate such candidate solutions is alleviated by the following routine. In every new generation, the candidate vector 
jworst  with the lowest fitness is replaced by a candidate vector  jmean  whose elements equal the mean participation 
probability of the vector with the highest fitness jbest. The new vector jmean replaces jworst only (22:) if its objective 
function value is better than that of jworst.
Algorithm 2:    Pseudocode for DE
1: Generate at random GGc and compute of(jg) with  jg Î  GGc
2: for g = 1 to G
3:   if jg = j-g ∀ jg, j-g Î  GGc
4:   j1 = rand(nx1)
5:   end if
6:   for g = 1 to NP
7:   jm = ji1 + f (ji2 – ji3)
8:   if jg = jm
9:   jm = mean(j)
10:   end if
11:   generate jng by combining jg and jm
12:   if of(jng) < of(jg)
13:   jng enters the new population GGn
14:   else
15:   jg enters the new population GGn
16:   end if
17:   end for
18:   GGc = GGn
19:   determine jbest, jworst Î  GGc
20:   generate jmean = ones(nx1)∙mean(jbest)
21:   if of(jmean) < of(jworst)
22:   replace jworst by jmean
23:   end if
24: end forJohannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -40-
 Appendix B Evaluating Optimization Outcomes and Bootstrap Estimation of Participation Probabilities
In section 2.3 the joint (over all firms) maximum of equation (19) is proposed to constitute a Nash-equilibrium that is 
found as the global minimum of equation (23). In this appendix, I show that the above DE-algorithm is appropriate to 
attain this Nash-Equilibrium for industries with either symmetric or asymmetric firms. Moreover, I analyze the 
determinants of firms' optimal participation probabilities. This is done based on a bootstrap-regression methodology.
In the following, industries are generated by randomly drawing values of the model's parameters within the 
bounds provided by Table 1. Therefore, an explanation for choosing these bounds is provided here. From the viewpoint 
of economic theory, the size of n is irrelevant as it only affects the scale of prices and quantities but has not impact on 
the ratio of profit-measures. Using mupper=100 as an upper bound is reasonable, as it suffices to give rather homogeneous 
goods. Choosing a1 Î [0.05,0.9] is reasonable because values below 0.05 would indicate that marginal costs are quite 
negligible. Such firms' production may be supposed to generate substantial fixed costs. These are beyond the scope of 
this model. If marginal costs were close to consumers' maximum willingness to pay (a1>0.9) the entire market might 
break down when costs shocks drive marginal costs further upwards. Choosing a4 Î [0.05,0.15] yields economically 
meaningful, however, not unrealistically large cost shocks. Drawing P from the wide interval [0.05,0.4] reflects our lack 
of knowledge about the effectiveness of competition authorities. This is because one knows the number of discovered 
cartels but can hardly determine the number of undiscovered ones. The interval encloses the 15-20% detection 
probability that some studies suggest. Choosing r Î [0.05,0.25] suggests that firms' discount rate is somewhere between 
the return of government bonds and some (ambitious) firms' target value of their return on equity. The number of firms 
is determined in the interval between 11 and 13 firms. The lower bound is chosen because in small industries firms 
always find it profitable to collude. The upper bound is determined such as to keep computation times at reasonable 
levels. 
In order to show DE's appropriateness for finding the global minimum of equation (22), the DE algorithm is 
run five times on 20 randomly generated industries. Industries 1-10 are characterized by symmetric firms where firms in 
industries 11-20 are asymmetric. The algorithm is run with CR=0.9, F=0.8, G=5,000 generations in the symmetric case 
and G=15,000 in the asymmetric case. The population size is ten times the number of firms. The optimization's results 
are presented in Table 3. The table provides the number of firms in an industry and the number of times the algorithm 
converges to the same solution. Moreover, the minimum, the median, and the maximum variation coefficient – i.e. the 
standard deviation of participation probabilities sj,i divided by the mean participation probability ji computed for 
each firm i – is displayed besides the mean participation probability. Moreover, the variation coefficient, the mean 
objective function value of  j and its standard deviation sof are presented. An interpretation of these results is 
provided in section 4.1.Johannes Paha Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms and Differentiated Products -41-
In the following, participation probabilities of firms in 95 randomly generated industries are regressed on a set 
of possibly explanatory variables. I only regard industries where no firm has an incentive to employ a pure strategy. 
First, a standard OLS-regression is run, whose results are presented in Table 4. It is found that some coefficients vary 
somewhat with the composition of the sample. In this case, standard statistical inference methods, which are based on 
asymptotic theory, may not be applicable in this finite sample. Therefore and second, a bootstrap procedure is 
implemented that provides estimates of standard errors and critical t-values based on the sample properties and, thus, 
allows for more accurate inferences. The properties of the 95 industries are determined randomly in the bounds 
provided by Table 1. Again, the number of firms is determined in the interval between 11 and 13 firms. Participation 
probabilities are obtained by running DE on each industry with G=10,000 generations, CR=0.9, and F=0.8.
The idea of the bootstrap is to run the regression B times (here B = 20,000) for different samples that are 
generated from the above initial sample with 95 industries. This gives a distribution of values for each coefficient from 
which, e.g., its standard error can be computed. Using a moving blocks bootstrap (Chernick 2008: 104), the B new 
samples are generated by randomly drawing 95 industries with replacement from the original sample. By drawing 
blocks of firms ( = industries) rather than firms themselves, I treat industries as independent but allow for dependence 
of firms within industries. Running the below regression for each sample (indicated by index b) not only yields 20,000 
values for the regression coefficients   b
*  that can be used to calculate its standard error  s  b




*− /s  b
*   (30)
that are located around the original estimate    . The null hypothesis H0:=0 may now be rejected at confidence-
level a if the test-statistic    −0/s  b
* lies outside the range defined by the lower a/2 and upper a/2 quantiles of the 
ordered test statistics t*. These intervals are provided in Table 4 for the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence-levels.
Table 3: Optimization Evaluation











1 12 5/5 1.55E-016 2.58E-016 3.74E-016 0.3999 0.3061 3.72E-034 1.14E-034
2 12 5/5 2.60E-016 4.38E-016 7.85E-016 0.2499 0.3695 2.43E-034 8.99E-035
3 13 5/5 2.33E-016 5.61E-016 1.00E-015 0.3566 0.1366 5.77E-033 7.88E-034
4 13 5/5 3.81E-016 5.74E-016 1.24E-015 0.3716 0.4205 8.14E-036 3.42E-036
5 12 5/5 1.20E-016 2.82E-016 7.08E-016 0.3998 0.3841 3.11E-036 1.19E-036
6 12 5/5 1.57E-016 3.60E-016 7.45E-016 0.2499 0.4304 1.39E-033 6.00E-034
7 13 5/5 1.93E-016 3.78E-016 6.83E-016 0.3521 0.1988 5.09E-034 1.01E-034
8 12 5/5 9.89E-017 2.84E-016 5.19E-016 0.3967 0.3579 3.63E-034 1.30E-034
9 12 5/5 1.79E-016 3.32E-016 5.55E-016 0.4091 0.1903 4.90E-037 9.33E-038











11 11 1/5 2.26E-003 4.53E-003 2.60E-002 0.4289 0.3317 1.49E-034 4.95E-035
12 11 1/5 1.67E-003 1.51E-002 4.18E-002 0.4206 0.3675 8.20E-033 3.01E-033
13 11 5/5 9.00E-017 2.12E-016 3.61E-016 0.4248 0.4238 3.45E-033 1.46E-033
14 13 5/5 2.46E-016 4.39E-016 6.61E-016 0.2756 0.1591 3.93E-033 6.25E-034
15 11 5/5 8.82E-017 1.90E-016 7.78E-016 0.4380 0.3069 9.26E-033 2.84E-033
16 11 1/5 5.46E-003 1.14E-002 3.31E-002 0.4144 0.2475 1.56E-032 3.86E-033
17 11 1/5 8.64E-001 1.18E+000 2.24E+000 0.2652 0.9284 2.12E-005 1.97E-005
18 12 4/5 1.46E-015 2.24E+000 2.24E+000 0.0517 2.2361 9.23E-005 2.06E-004
19 11 3/5 1.30E-001 1.92E-001 7.11E-001 0.3608 2.2319 1.13E-003 2.53E-003
20 12 1/5 1.40E-001 5.70E-001 8.87E-001 0.3969 2.2150 6.95E-005 1.54E-004
# runs to the 
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The results are interpreted in section 4.2. Participation probabilities j, the percentage deviation from mean 
marginal costs mc_dev, the detection probability P, and the interest rate r are defined in percentage points, i.e. in the 
interval [0;100]. (mc_dev ≥ 0) is an indicator-variable that takes a value of 1, when the marginal costs of firm i are at or 
above the level of mean marginal costs in the industry, and a value of 0 otherwise. (mc_dev < 0) is an indicator-variable 
that takes a value of 1, when the marginal costs of firm i are below the level of mean marginal costs in the industry, and 
a value of 0 otherwise.
Table 4: Participation Probabilities
dependent variable
regressors coefficient t-values bootstrap critical t-values
OLS Bootstrap 1% 5% 10%
constant 65.756 17.398*** 17.641*** -0.60 0.51 -0.43 0.40 -0.36 0.33
3.779 3.727
6.175 3.462*** 1.447 -10.98 3.22 -8.26 2.59 -6.88 2.25
1.784 4.266
8.089 4.653*** 3.148*** -2.78 2.35 -1.83 1.74 -1.30 1.38
1.738 2.570
1.188 11.566*** 6.902*** -0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.05
0.103 0.172
0.553 5.499*** 3.892*** -0.10 0.10 -0.07 0.07 -0.06 0.06
0.100 0.142
degree of homogeneity m 0.252 6.608*** 5.604*** -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01
0.038 0.045
-0.002 -5.253*** -4.653*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.000 0.000
detection probability P  -0.156 -6.334*** -5.440*** -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
0.025 0.029
discount rate r -0.077 -1.768** -1.603*** -0.07 0.08 -0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.05
0.044 0.048
number of firms n -2.395 -7.937*** -6.693*** -0.15 0.12 -0.11 0.10 -0.09 0.08
0.302 0.358
cost parameters -0.062 -4.451*** -3.172*** -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
0.014 0.020
1.589 1.947** 1.625**  -1.42 1.68 -1.05 1.31 -0.88 1.10
0.816 0.978
-11.376 -1.291* -1.249 -19.96 17.74 -15.29 13.45 -12.83 11.03
8.813 9.109
R² 41.76%
42.43%
participation probabilities (j)
mc_dev·(mc_dev ≥ 0)
mc_dev·(mc_dev < 0)
m·mc_dev·(mc_dev ≥ 0)
m·mc_dev·(mc_dev < 0)
m²
c/n
a3
a4
R²